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The purpose of this paper is to examine the short-run effects of economic 
sanctions taking the form of restrictions on international trade in goods and 
services, as well as brakes on international financial flows. A Keynesian 
disequilibrium, demand driven macroeconomic paradigm is postulated. The 
target country is envisaged to be part of the global South, the sender country is 
viewed to be located in the global North, and the sanctions are general rather 
than targeted at specific firms and sectors. The trade sanctions can take two 
forms: a diminution of exports to the target country and a reduction in exports 
from the target nation. Both type of sanctions damage the target country’s 
economy on impact: the first by lowering aggregate supply in the target 
country, the latter by worsening its terms of trade. From the viewpoint of the 
sender country, its economy may benefit from the demand generated by the 
rent from export restrictions to the targeted economy. Financial sanctions are 
more unequivocal in their damage to the target economy, they lower the supply 
of funds or capital in the target nation with adverse consequences for the 
supply of credit, investment finance, as well as reduced options on how to 
finance government expenditure. 
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International economic sanctions are akin to Clausewitz’s (1832) definition of war: they fall into the 
category of politics by other means. The avowed aim of economic sanctions is to change the behaviour 
of targeted nations, or to make it more compliant with the sender country’s (mainly the United States 
in the post-1945 era) or multilateral institution’s (United Nations, European Union) objectives as to 
how the target country should behave. Therefore, the objective is political; the means employed are, 
however, economic. Economic sanctions take a variety of forms, including the institution of 
restrictions on international trade, as well as on international financial flows. A seminal work in this 
connection was by Hufbauer and Schott (1985), who also provided a data set on the deployment of 
economic sanctions. The literature on whether economic sanctions ‘work’ in coercing change in the 
target country’s behaviour is a matter of some controversy; see van Bergeijk (2019a) on this 
inconclusive literature. Schneider and Weber (2019) argue that sanctions or ‘economic coercion’ met 
with some success during the period 1989 to 2016, which they characterize as the ‘liberal’ era. There 
is also some evidence that economic sanctions work better on impact and when they are of a short 
duration, compared to long-term sanctions; Dijazi and van Bergeijk (2013) for the obvious reason that 
the targeted nation can make alternative arrangements to bypass the sanction.  However, van 
Marrewijk and van Bergeijk (1995) indicate that sanctions may work in the long-run if the target nation 
gradually learns about the credibility of sanctions, costs to its economy and the sender’s determination. 
Furthermore, there is also a debate about whether unilateral (imposed solely by the United States, say) 
or multilateral sanctions (joint United States and the European Union sanctions on Iran, or African 
Union sanctions, for example) work better in changing behaviour (Bapat and Clifton, 2009), as well 
as the superiority of sanctions that target individual firms rather than the target’s entire economy in 
general (Ahn and Ludema, 2019). 
The purpose of this paper is not to look at the success or failure of the sanctions in inducing 
behavioural or policy change, or the degree thereof, but to analyze the macroeconomic effects of 
sanctions on the sender and target country’s economies. We begin by examining trade sanctions, 
followed by financial flow restrictions. In the analysis presented below the target country is a 
developing country, and the sender a developed country, thus placing the analysis within the genre of 
macroeconomic models of North-South interaction, although financial sanctions will be analyzed in a 
single country context. The analysis of financial sanctions will be conducted in a single country 
context, focusing on the targeted country’s economy.    
2 Trade sanctions 
There is considerable similarity between trade policies aimed at restricting or re-directing the quantum 
or pattern of international trade and economic sanctions, restricting international trade in goods and 
services, imposed by external powers. Forrer and Harrington (2019) indicate that the Trump 
administration, in particular, is increasingly using trade policy in the form of import tariffs as both 
trade policy and a sanction instruments. Also, van Bergeijk (2019b) indicates the growth of 
mercantilist, beggar my neighbor, tendencies in the global trade arena. This section will treat sanctions 
in the light of open economy macroeconomic models dealing with trade policy (Mundell, 1961; Ford 
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and Sen, 1985; Murshed 1992a and 1992b). The macroeconomic motivation for utilizing trade policy 
is to target output and employment, and not necessarily improvements in the terms of trade as in the 
neoclassical pure theory of international trade or enhance market share for domestic firms as with the 
economies of scale argument put forward by the new theories of international trade. In this case, trade 
restrictions are utilized to damage the target country’s economy. The macroeconomic effects of 
sanctions are considered by Eyler (2007, chapter 5) in a context of a Ramsey type new open economy 
model, unlike the disequilibrium Keynesian models we consider below.   
This section presents a simple two country theoretical macroeconomic model of trade sanctions 
to capture the immediate impact of trade sanctions. We describe the sanctions imposing country as the 
North (N) and the target country as the South (S). This is in line with the author’s earlier work with 
structuralist macro-models: see Taylor (1983), for a seminal exposition of macro-models in this genre. 
The key to structuralist models is some asymmetry with standard models, at least some features which 
differentiate economies in the global South with those in the global North. In the case of this paper, 
the global South is dependent on an import of a particular good from the North, which enhances its 
aggregate supply. This is akin to the import multiplier effect on output in a repressed inflation or 
supply constrained regime (Malinvaud, 1977).  
There are two types of sanctions under consideration imposed by the global North on the South. 
The first is to do with restricting the North’s exports to the South. Even when it is a quantitative 
restriction, it will have a price or tax equivalent. The effect of this super-sanction is that it raises both 
the price of the North’s good in the South, as well as diminishing aggregate supply or capacity 
utilization in the South. The second sanction is an import tariff, which increases the price of the 
South’s goods (exports) in the North (its import). In what follows, both types of sanctions are analysed 
independently. 
The equilibrium equation in the goods market for the North, the sanction imposing country is  
𝑃𝑁 𝑌𝑁(𝑃𝑁 ) = 𝑃𝑁 𝐴(𝑌𝑁 + 𝑣𝑋𝑁; 𝑃𝑆(1 + 𝜏)) + 𝑃𝑁 𝑋𝑁(𝑌𝑆; 𝑃𝑁 (1 + 𝑣))[1 + 𝑣] − 𝑃𝑆𝑋𝑆(𝑌𝑁 +
𝑣𝑋𝑁; 𝑃𝑆(1 + 𝜏))[1 + 𝜏]          (1) 
On the left hand side we have aggregate supply, and on the right hand side we have components of 
aggregate demand: total absorption or expenditure, plus exports minus imports. Outside equilibrium 
excess demand cause prices to rise. Observe that the disposable income in the North is augmented by 
the export sanctions revenue, vXN, and excess demand for output causes, the price of the good in the 
North, PN to increase. The other rent composed of the import tariff revenue equivalent on the 
restrictions on imports from the South (τXS) is dissipated and accrues to third countries outside the 
macroeconomic model.   
Here:  
PN= price of the composite good in the North; 
PS = the price of the composite good in the South; 
YN= aggregate output or income in the North; 
YS= aggregate output or income in the South income; 
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XN = exports of the North to the South, which is a positive function of the South’s income, YS, but 
negatively related to PN; 
XS = imports of the North from the South, which is a positive function of YN but negatively related 
to price, PS 
A= absorption or expenditure (sum of private and public consumption and investment) in the North) 
v = the ad-valorem tax equivalent of the restrictions on the North’s exports to the South, which also 
has a negative impact on output in the South, the revenues from which are re-distributed back to 
households in a Meade like lump-sum fashion. In other words, they do not alter the distribution of 
income; 
τ = the ad-valorem tax equivalent of the restrictions on the exports (imports) of the South (North) to 
the South 
Note that in equation (1), 𝐴2 =
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑃𝑆
= 𝑋𝑆(1 − 𝜀) > 0, where ε is the elasticity of real absorption 
with respect to real income, this is the Laursen-Metzler (1950) effect; see Murshed (1997, pp 24-25) 
for a detailed derivation.  A rise in the South’s relative price or a deterioration in the North’s terms of 
trade causes its real income to decline but real absorption falls less than proportionately, so there is an 
aggregate demand boost. The Laursen-Metzler effect played a key role in Mundell’s (1961) analysis of 
the macroeconomic effects of trade policy, as well as in Ford and Sen (1985) and Murshed (1992a and 
1992b). 
Furthermore: 𝐴1 > 0, 𝐴2 > 0, 𝑋𝑁1 > 0, 𝑋𝑁2 < 0, 𝑋𝑆1 > 0, 𝑋𝑆2 < 0, 𝑓1 > 0,  
In the South the supply of output (YS) is negatively impacted on by the North’s export sanction 
or super-sanction, v, otherwise excess demand, otherwise excess demand causes the price of the 
South’s good to increase. 
𝑌𝑆 =g(𝑃𝑆 , 𝑣) ⋯ 𝑔1 > 0, 𝑔2 < 0         (2) 
We substitute the above expression into (1) and the equation that follows. The equilibrium condition 
for macroeconomic balance in the South, utilizing equation (2) to describe aggregate supply emerges 
as: 
𝑃𝑆𝑔(𝑃𝑆, 𝑣) = 𝑃𝑆𝐸(𝑔(𝑃𝑆, 𝑣)) + 𝑃𝑆𝑋𝑆(𝑌𝑁 + 𝑣𝑋𝑁; 𝑃𝑆(1 + 𝜏)) − 𝑃𝑁 𝑋𝑁(𝑌𝑆; 𝑃𝑁 (1 + 𝑣))  (3) 
On the left hand side we have aggregate supply, and on the right hand side we have components of 
aggregate demand: total absorption or expenditure, plus exports minus imports. Outside equilibrium 
excess demand cause prices to rise; E is the sum of private and public expenditure in the South, 𝐸1 >
0. 
In the analysis that follows we set initial values of PN, PS = 1, and initial v and τ = 0, but the partial 
derivatives associated with these variables are not equal to zero or unity. Totally differentiating 






(𝐴1 − 1 − 𝑋𝑆1)𝑓1 + 𝑋𝑁2 𝑋𝑆(1 − 𝜀) + 𝑋𝑁1𝑔1 − 𝑋𝑆2





   
= [
−𝐴1𝑋𝑁 − 𝑋𝑁1𝑔2 − 𝑋𝑁2𝑃𝑁 − 𝑋𝑁 −𝑋𝑆(1 − 𝜖) + 𝑋𝑆2𝑃𝑆 + 𝑋𝑆




]              (4) 
In (4) the trace of the Jacobian is negative and the determinant of the Jacobian is: 
𝐽 =  (𝐴1 − 1 − 𝑋𝑆1)𝑓1𝑔1(𝐸1 − 1) − (𝐴1 − 1)𝑓1𝑔1𝑋𝑁1 − (𝐴1 − 1 − 𝑋𝑆1)𝑓1𝑔1𝑋𝑁1 +
(𝐴1 − 1)𝑓1𝑋𝑆2 + 𝑋𝑁2((𝐸1 − 1 − 𝑋𝑁1)𝑔1 − (𝑋𝑆1𝑓1-𝑋𝑁2) 𝑋𝑆(1 − 𝜖)   (5) 
The above expression is positive and the model is stable if, for absolute values the following 
inequality holds: 
(𝐸1 − 1 − 𝑋𝑁1)𝑔1 > 𝑋𝑆(1 − 𝜖)         (6) 
In what follows, we shall treat J > 0.  





−𝐴1𝑋𝑁[𝐸1 − 1 − 𝑋𝑁1 + 𝑋𝑆2 − 𝑔1𝑋𝑁1] + 𝑔2[𝑋𝑁1𝑋𝑁1𝑔1 + (1 − 𝐸1)𝑋𝑆2] − (𝑋𝑁2𝑃𝑁+𝑋𝑁)(𝐸1 − 1 − 𝑋𝑁1)𝑔1




The above expression is positive only if 𝑋𝑁 > 𝑋𝑁2 and if (1 − 𝐸1)𝑋𝑆2 > 𝑋𝑁1𝑋𝑁1. In other words, 
the demand for the North’s good is price inelastic in the South; the marginal propensity to spend and 
import are low in the South; the price elasticity of the South’s exports is high.  There is excess demand 
in the North due to the sanctioned export rent being diverted towards domestic expenditure and this 
causes greater capacity utilization and output increases. Although we do not explicitly model a 
government sector, if the trade restriction rents accrue to a government with a higher propensity to 
spend then the expansionary effect could be greater for the North’s economy.  










The above expression will be positive if (1 − 𝐸1)𝑔2 > 𝐴1𝑓1 in absolute value. There is excess 
demand in the South due to falling aggregate supply or capacity utilization. There is inflation due to a 
supply shock, unless the inflation is suppressed as in a Malinvaud (1977) type fix-price model via 
rationing. Thus, clearly super-sanctions hurt the target country, although some of the adverse effect 
can be mitigated in the long-run via sourcing of lost imports from other countries.    
We now turn to the impact of the ‘lighter’ trade sanction, in other words, a restriction on goods 






      (9) 
 The sign is ambiguous. A necessary condition for the above expression to be positive is only if 𝑋𝑆2 >
𝑋𝑆, in other words the price elasticity of demand for the South’s good is elastic. The elimination of 
the Laursen-Metzler effect on absorption in the North will also serve to enhance aggregate demand, 
as the effect works in a negative direction in this instance. 






 < 0       (10) 
Trade sanctions are immiserizing for the South; both types of trade sanctions damage its economy. 
Restrictions on the exports of the South hurt the target country’s economy by deteriorating its terms 
of trade, and the restriction of exports to the target country, described here as the South, damage 
aggregate supply even if there is a tendency for the target nation’s terms of trade to improve as 
presented in the theoretical model of Eyler (2007, chapter5). Of course, in the longer run, if sanctions 
persist the target economy has greater scope to adjust and source goods from third countries. We have 
largely abstracted from trade diversion to third countries in order to gather the impact effects of 
unanticipated trade sanctions in target nations. The sanction sender nation can actually profit from 
sending the sanction, if the sanction export restriction rents accrue to its domestic economy or 
government, and also via improved terms of trade when it restricts the target country’s exports. 
3 Financial sanctions 
In this section we will focus on financial restrictions targeted to a developing country in the global 
South. We will focus solely on the economy of the South by introducing a monetary sector. Financial 
sanctions will be proxied by a reduction in the supply of money, as the target economy finds greater 
difficulty in accessing international sources of funds. We do not believe we should introduce 
international capital flows and equilibrium covered or uncovered interest parity relations as described 
in say, Dornbusch (1980), as such equilibrium concepts may not apply to developing countries, even 
the more emerging market economies there. After examining the effects of financial sanctions (money 
supply restrictions) in a simple analytical macro-model of the South, we will go on to look at the 




The goods market equilibrium condition for the South is a slightly modified version of equation 
(3) above: 
𝑃𝑆𝑔(𝑃𝑆, 𝑣) = 𝑃𝑆𝐸(𝑔(𝑃𝑆, 𝑣); 𝑟) + 𝑃𝑆𝑋𝑆(𝑌𝑁 + 𝑣𝑋𝑁; 𝑃𝑆(1 + 𝜏)) − 𝑃𝑁 𝑋𝑁(𝑌𝑆; 𝑃𝑁 (1 + 𝑣)) ⋯ 𝐸2 <
0                (11) 
Thus, the only change is that domestic expenditure is made a negative function of the (nominal) 
interest rate, r, indicating the negative interest elasticity of (investment) expenditure. 
Turning to the money market we postulate a simple money demand equation, HD, which is a 
positive function of income and negatively related to the interest rate. The supply of money, H, is not 
just a domestic monetary policy concern and can, however be negatively impacted by external financial 
sanctions, θ.  Thus, in equilibrium, where excess demand for money causes interest rates to rise and 
vice versa: 
𝐻𝐷(𝑔(𝑃𝑆, 𝑣); 𝑟) = 𝐻(𝜃) ⋯ 𝐻1 < 0, 𝐻𝐷1 > 0, 𝐻𝐷2 < 0       (12) 
Totally differentiating (11) and (12) after writing them in excess demand (initial PN, PS = 1), we 
can arrange them in the following matrix format (ignoring the trade sanctions policies in this exercise): 
[








] 𝑑𝜃     (13) 
Here we may envisage = −𝑑𝐾 , the financial sanction leads to an attenuation of international capital 
inflows, K.  
The trace of the Jacobian matrix in (13) is negative and the determinant (J) can be demonstrated 
to be positive: 
𝐽 = [(𝐸1 − 1 − 𝑋𝑁1)𝑔1 + 𝑋𝑆2 − 𝑋𝑁1𝑔1]𝐻𝐷2 − 𝐸2𝐻𝐷1𝑔1 > 0     (14) 













> 0        (16) 
Financial sanctions hit hard, there is a decline in aggregate supply causing output to decline, as can be 
seen by the tendency of prices to fall due to excess supply in (15). The prime cause is the rise in interest 
rates as can be discerned from equation (16), which is caused by the paucity of credit and sources of 
funding, and from there on leading to negative consequences for the real economy, particularly on 
investment.   
Turning now to balance of payments considerations, a simple formulation can be the following: 
𝑃𝑆𝑋𝑆(𝑌𝑁 + 𝑣𝑋𝑁; 𝑃𝑆(1 + 𝜏)) − 𝑃𝑁 𝑋𝑁(𝑌𝑆; 𝑃𝑁 (1 + 𝑣)) − 𝐸(𝐷 + 𝑟
∗𝐷) + 𝐾 = 𝑅                 (17) 
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Here we have postulated fixed exchange rates, but this can be easily modified into a managed flexible 
exchange rate regime. The nominal exchange rate, E, will rise (depreciate) with balance of payments 
deficits and vice-versa. In (17) we have exports minus imports as the first two terms on the left-hand 
side; the third term is external debt servicing, where D represents inherited external debt, and r*D 
stands for interest payments on the debt, which attracts a foreign interest rate, r* and K represents 
current capital inflows from abroad.  Balance of payments surpluses lead to an increase in foreign 
exchange reserves, R, and deficits have the opposite effect,   
The joint impact of both trade and financial sanctions on the balance of payments in equation 
(17) will take the following form (again initial PN, PS = 1 and describing the combined trade and 
financial sanctions as S) 









− 𝑑𝐸(𝐷 + 𝑟∗𝐷) − 𝑑(𝐷 + 𝑟∗𝐷)𝐸 + 𝑑𝐾     (18) 
In (18) above both imports and exports are likely to decline, the exchange rate is likely to depreciate 
(rise in absolute terms), debt servicing burdens rise as the exchange rate depreciates and capital flows 
will decline. Thus, the balance of payments will worsen, reserves of foreign currency will decline along 
with a simultaneous depreciation in the nominal exchange rate. 
If he hypothetical sanctions target nation were to have a government sector, the manner in which 
government expenditure, G could be financed takes the following form:  
EDrrBTGDEBH *)(* ++−=++          (19) 
The government’s spending is on the right hand side of (19) which is its spending G less revenues, T 
plus interest payments on the domestic bond, B and interest payments on external borrowing. The 
left hand side indicates the sources of funding for the government which can be money financed (from 
the central bank) or via a domestic bond or foreign borrowing. The dot over a variable denotes a rate 
of change over time. Financial sanctions will lower the availability of external borrowing, leading to a 
diminution of options for the state.  
4 Summary 
In conclusion, this paper has examined the short-run effects of economic sanctions taking the form 
of restrictions on international trade in goods and services, as well as brakes on international financial 
flows. A Keynesian disequilibrium, demand driven macroeconomic paradigm is postulated. The target 
country is envisaged to be part of the global South, the sender country is viewed to be located in the 
global North, and the sanctions are general rather than targeted at specific firms and sectors. The trade 
sanctions can take two forms: a diminution of exports to the target country and a reduction in exports 
from the target nation. Both type of sanctions damage the target country’s economy on impact: the 
first by lowering aggregate supply in the target country, the latter by worsening its terms of trade. 
From the viewpoint of the sender country, its economy may benefit from the demand generated by 
the rent from export restrictions to the targeted economy. Financial sanctions are more unequivocal 
in their damage to the target economy, they lower the supply of funds or capital in the target nation 
with adverse consequences for the supply of credit, investment finance, as well as diminished options 
on how to finance government expenditure. In the longer run, however, there may be greater to scope 
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to adjust for the target economy, but this is not without cost. Similarly, the costs to the sender nation’s 
economy will accumulate with the persistence of the sanction.        
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